Interview with Ethan Goldrich

Former US Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Levant and Syria Engagement

Q: Would you have believed six months ago that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) would control Damascus? Did the speed of their advance surprise you? Why didn’t Russia intervene—and could there have been a deal with Türkiye?

No, I wouldn’t have believed it.  When I left my position in mid-September, we had a sense that an Israeli operation in Lebanon would have repercussions for Syria, but the idea of HTS taking Damascus wasn’t on the radar. That same week, Israeli operations in Lebanon escalated, weakening Hezbollah’s ability to support the Syrian regime and contain HTS in the northwest. By the time of the ceasefire around 27 November, HTS likely saw an opening and moved quickly. The US focus up until that time was still much more on Lebanon than on Syria.

Yes, I was surprised at how fast it happened. I expected Iran, Hezbollah, or especially Russia to step in—but Russia didn’t even try. They just stepped aside and let it unfold. We had always wondered how the Ukraine war was impacting Russia’s role in Syria, but didn’t realize they had become so weak and distracted that they would not keep Assad afloat.

As for a Russia-Türkiye deal, I highly doubt it. Their coordination, particularly through Astana, was never smooth or productive. I never saw any indication they could have pulled off something as major as collaborating to remove Assad without the world noticing.

Q: Where did the Syrian opposition succeed, and where did it fall short?

Their biggest success was keeping the hope for change in Syria alive. Even when the Arab League and others moved toward normalization with Assad, the opposition ensured that those efforts remained half-hearted. They kept Syria on the international agenda, maintained pressure through sanctions and UN mechanisms, and prevented full normalization with a regime still seen as a pariah.

They also laid groundwork for a future Syria—working on constitutional ideas, civil society, and governance alternatives, even under dire circumstances. That persistence means that when Assad fell, there was something for the international community to engage with—so HTS wasn’t the only option.

Their presence is also shaping HTS’s behavior today. Even HTS is attempting inclusivity in ways it likely wouldn’t have if the opposition had simply disappeared. That’s a credit to the opposition’s endurance.

Were they perfect? No. The Syrian National Coalition and others weren’t always inclusive enough, but there were late efforts to bring in new, more diverse and younger voices. Still, no matter how well they performed, they couldn’t have toppled Assad while Russia and Iran were backing him militarily. Until those props disappeared, Assad felt he didn’t need to give an inch.

Q: Was the US position on Syria principled?

Yes. Once Assad was firmly propped up by Russia and Iran, it was not realistic for the US to remove him militarily. The Biden administration focused instead on humanitarian aid, accountability, and counterterrorism in the northeast—prioritizing areas where the US had real leverage. They tried to preserve the political process, and maintain ceasefires. Wars in Ukraine and Gaza further complicated the situation. All the while, the US refused to normalize with Assad, believing it was wrong and ultimately ineffective. In hindsight, not engaging with the regime was clearly the right call.

Q: Was it principled to intervene only against ISIS, not Assad, despite Assad causing far more civilian deaths?

US policy prioritizes US national security. ISIS directly threatened US interests and allies, making intervention more politically and strategically justifiable. While Assad’s brutality caused great suffering, US administrations were not prepared to engage in another full-scale intervention in the region. The US instead emphasized humanitarian aid and support to refugees, but military resources were reserved for missions with clearer strategic stakes. That’s the political reality.

Q: Some argue for using one US-designated terrorist group to fight another. Do you think that worked in Syria?

This debate is shaped by history—people still think back to Afghanistan in the 1980s and the US working with jihadi groups at that time. But the real question is whether a group like HTS in a different place and a different time has shown the capacity to evolve.

From what I saw, even while in government, HTS seemed different—more adaptive. I’m not saying we should have engaged with them back then—they were still a designated group and we had other priorities—but there were signs something unusual was happening in northwest Syria.

[Interim President] Sharaa, too, appears to be trying to show he can evolve, whether out of self-interest or something more. So rather than asking, “Should we work with terrorists?” the better question is “If a group evolves into something else, can we help shape that evolution?”

Personally, I think we should. If they show signs of progress, it would be unwise to keep punishing them under outdated policies. We need both carrots and sticks to steer behavior.

Q: Do you believe Sharaa and HTS have changed? What would it take for the US to support delisting them from terrorist designations?

It’s hard to say definitively if they’ve changed—but the way forward should be to engage, observe, and reward positive steps, while withholding support or reapplying pressure if they regress. It’s a long process and needs to be based on behavior.

The clearest path is for them to align with UNSC Resolution 2254. It may be old, but it still outlines key benchmarks: an inclusive transitional government, a political process, and eventually a constitution. HTS’s recent steps toward forming a transitional government are a start, though far from perfect.

Rather than drafting a whole new UN resolution—which could get bogged down in geopolitics and Security Council dynamics—we should use 2254 as a framework. If Sharaa’s government moves toward inclusivity, avoids excluding minorities and women, and makes real progress on governance and reform, then we should find ways to recognize that. If not, we hold the line.

Q: How do you balance rewarding good behavior without enabling a new authoritarian regime?

It’s a real challenge. You can’t blindly reward progress—what matters is the quality of institutions being built. Are power and responsibility shared, or is everything concentrated under HTS? Are independent voices involved? That’s how you assess the risk of future authoritarianism.

A stable Syria isn’t enough—what replaces Assad must be better, not just different. This moment presents a narrow opportunity for meaningful change. If we get it wrong, we risk helping create another dictatorship that sows future instability.

Q: Should sanctions on Damascus be lifted now or used as leverage?

They should absolutely be used as leverage, but more effectively. Not through blanket or immediate removal—but through clear, realistic steps and consistent dialogue. The Syrian government needs to see that progress can lead to tangible benefits in a reasonable timeframe.

Right now, there’s little visible incentive. If we maintain a policy of “do everything, then we’ll think about sanctions,” they’ll turn elsewhere—Russia, China, or extremist actors. That vacuum can be dangerous. Instead, we need a step-by-step approach: if Damascus does x, we lift or ease y. That’s how to keep influence and avoid fueling hopelessness.

Q: So you’re calling for a more active US approach to Syria?

Yes—but not just academic debates like before. This is a real government seeking recognition and resources. So we should adopt a step-by-step approach: dial sanctions back gradually in exchange for clear, positive actions.

Immediate removal would be a mistake—we’d lose leverage. And with US humanitarian aid limited, sanctions relief may be one of the few incentives we can still offer.

What’s urgently needed is more direct engagement. Senior US officials should visibly talk to this new government and clarify what steps could unlock real benefits. There are people in Washington who see the complexity of the situation—hopefully, their voices are heard. Done right, this could be a real foreign policy success.

Q: What advice would you give to the current Syrian leadership, regional partners, and advocacy groups?

Syria has a rare opportunity. Many powerful countries still care about what happens there—and if the new leadership engages them wisely, it could bring real benefits.

Talk to Türkiye about stability and border concerns. Engage the US—there’s still a US military presence, so why not explore a framework, like in Iraq, that clarifies roles and brings mutual benefit? Reassure Lebanon that Syria won’t interfere as before.  Even with Israel, try to restore calm and avoid escalation—perhaps reaching a modus vivendi via third parties, if not directly.

Show Europe that Syria is becoming a safe, cooperative state, and needs their support to enable more substantial refugee returns. Tackle the Captagon trade seriously—countries like Jordan will take notice. And if the government proves it’s on a better path, Gulf countries may be willing to invest seriously in Syria’s future.

If Sharaa is serious, he could be remembered not as another strongman—but as a transformative leader who built something new for Syria and the region.

As for advocacy groups, they should stay engaged—especially with the US administration. They should help officials see Syria not just as part of a broader regional template, but as a specific place that provides a unique, timely opportunity. If done right, smart engagement could lead to real achievements—and credit—for those involved.

In Europe, where resources are more available, advocates should ensure they’re channeled effectively, especially as US support may decline.

Finally, avoid getting entangled in internal Syrian politics. Don’t back individual players or factions. That undermines credibility. Instead, approach this as Syrians abroad working for the good of the country—not one political figure. Constructive pressure—like urging inclusivity and reform—is helpful. Playing favorites is not.

Q: In a post-Assad context, how should the US handle individual sanctions—especially those imposed symbolically or on technocrats? Should they still be used as leverage, and what mechanisms exist for removal?

There should be a comprehensive review of all Syria-related sanctions. Listings that were symbolic or that targeted technocrats may be outdated in the current context.

That said, sanctions shouldn’t be lifted all at once. The direction should be toward gradual removal, using them as leverage to encourage positive behavior. If the new government sees that certain steps—like being more inclusive—lead to concrete relief, that creates momentum. But if there’s no light at the end of the tunnel, no indication that change will be rewarded, they’ll go elsewhere—China, Russia, or worse.

What’s needed is more direct engagement. The US should talk to the new Syrian government, lay out a clear list of things to do, and show that steps forward will be met with relief. That way, sanctions can remain a tool—not just for punishment, but to help steer things in the right direction.