The State Sponsor of Terrorism (SST) designation has long served as a blunt instrument of U.S. foreign policy. In Syria’s case, the designation—imposed in 1979 in response to support for armed non-state actors—was reinforced over decades through direct regime involvement in international attacks and sustained backing of Hezbollah. Today, with the Assad regime no longer in power and Syria shifting away from its historic alliances, the legal criteria for delisting have been formally satisfied. These include a change in leadership and policy, the end of support for terrorism, and credible guarantees of non-recurrence, including cooperation with U.S. counterterrorism efforts. This report outlines the political and legal framework for rescinding the designation and argues that the case for delisting now rests on political will, not statutory constraint.

Targeted sanctions are often viewed as the precision-guided munitions of economic statecraft. Yet in Syria, where sanctioned actors control core economic sectors, these measures can trigger unintended systemic effects. While the EU has lifted sectoral sanctions to enable reconstruction, its targeted sanctions continue to obstruct the very actors and transactions needed to achieve it. This report proposes a methodology to determine whether such listings should be lifted or maintained, based on their real-world impact on economic recovery.

As the EU prepares to renew its sanctions on Syria, this article argues for their immediate and unconditional repeal. While initially grounded in legal and moral opposition to Assad’s repression, the sanctions are now misaligned with Syria’s political reality, ineffective in promoting recovery, and counterproductive to EU interests. The report urges the EU to abandon all sectoral sanctions and maintain relevant targeted sanctions by transferring names from the Syria program to the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime. Letting the Assad-era sanctions expire, Dr. Shaar contends, is not a concession to impunity but a necessary step toward restoring principled and effective EU policy.

As Russia’s war in Ukraine drags on, new patterns of foreign recruitment have emerged from Syria. This report profiles three key intermediaries involved in recruiting Syrian men—often civilians and unfit for combat—for deployment to Ukraine. Based on interviews with recruits, open-source research, and field investigation, it documents recruitment methods, financial exploitation, and the broader role of intermediaries in Russia’s global efforts to source fighters. It also assesses the future of Syrian recruitment following the fall of the Assad regime.

In the decade preceding the downfall of the Assad regime, Russia’s economic influence in Syria increased significantly. By providing political and—from September 2015—military support, Russia secured leverage over Damascus and established a foothold in the energy, extractive, and security sectors. This study bridges knowledge gaps by mapping Russian economic interests, identifying key players and ultimate beneficiaries using front partners to evade scrutiny and sanctions. Using OPEN's database, official and unofficial sources, and OSINT, the authors identify ties between 35 Russian firms and a network of 330 individuals and entities. Finally, the report summarizes the fate of these investments following the downfall of the regime.