EXTERNAL CONTRIBUTION: The Alawite Massacres and the Future of Syria

Yassin al-Haj Saleh, Syrian writer, leftist dissident, and former political prisoner who spent 16 years incarcerated under the Hafez al-Assad regime

Like all honeymoons, the “Syrian revolutionary honeymoon”—in the words of Asef Bayat—was destined to end eventually. For nearly three months, many people were happy and in a celebratory mood after the fall of the Assad family regime, which had ruled the country for 54 suffocating years. But the end of the honeymoon came in a painful way: a hard awakening to five days of massacres in the coastal region between March 6 and 10. Most of the victims were Alawites, who make up close to 12% of Syria’s population and to whom the Assad family belongs. There had already been low-scale frictions and tensions in the region, with casualties from this confessional group [Alawites], but what began on March 6 was something else entirely—both in scale and in its semi-genocidal nature. People were targeted and entire families decimated for one reason only: being Alawite. Houses were burned, property stolen, elders insulted. The main sources for the carnage were the perpetrators themselves, who inadvertently—or even proudly—filmed their heinous crimes and shared them publicly. It was a deep shock, a traumatizing experience for Syrians who had hoped that the monstrous times were now behind them.

On the fourth day of the massacres, the transitional president, Ahmad al-Sharaa, established a committee to investigate “the events in the coast.” A man who seems to believe deeply in the power of committees, he formed another one—a civil peace committee—and appointed an Alawite, a childhood friend of his, as one of its three members.

The bloodshed began when some armed loyalists of the fallen regime attacked General Security forces in rural parts of Latakia, killing some and capturing others. This appears to have triggered a wave of panic among many Sunni communities, afraid they might lose the power they had only just gained. The fear was stoked by mosque imams who called people to jihad. Thousands of armed men stormed Alawite villages and began killing in a Rwandan-like fashion—though on a smaller scale and over a shorter time. Some of the perpetrators were driven by religious doctrines that viewed Alawites as infidels; they targeted men of fighting age. Others were fueled by sectarian hatred, believing all Alawites to be loyalists of the Assad regime; these attackers killed indiscriminately, slaughtering entire families—even children. The role of General Security personnel was mixed: some protected civilians, while others participated in the massacres.

The number of victims may exceed 1,000, possibly even 2,000. It is legitimate to speak of genocidal violence, not just oppressive violence, because the “crime” of most victims was who they were—not what they did. This kind of violence has its roots in what I call the “genocratic” structure of Syria’s current government—and of the former regime. By genocracy, I mean the rule of a genos (from Greek: race, dynasty, tribe…), rather than the demos (the people), regardless of whether the genos is a majority or a minority. A genos can be a religious, racial, ethnic, or national group—the same ones named in the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948. What we call “sectarianism” in Syria and the Middle East is a genocratic arrangement that politicizes inherited differences and pits them against one another. Genocratic regimes and movements do not only undo democracy by eliminating the demos; they also prepare the ground for genocides.

Syria’s state and social order have been trapped in genocratic politics since Hafez al-Assad came to power in 1970. Since then, sectarianism became structural in the making and remaking of state power. The Islamization of the Syrian revolution in 2012 and afterward cannot be understood apart from this background—at least not completely.

The new rule in Syria has acted as genocratically as the Assad regime—that is, in a sectarian way. The fact that Sunnis are the demographic majority changes nothing. This means the genocidal violence that broke out so indiscriminately along the coast is organically tied to the sectarianization of the state. The history of the Assad regime includes many genocidal massacres, and this has entrenched genocidal tendencies in Syrian society. Syria’s hope of avoiding future massacres depends on fighting sectarianism head-on. 

This is not an impossible mission. Two things are essential for success: first, the state must not discriminate among its citizens or sectarianize its institutions; second, citizens must be able to build independent organizations and political parties across religious and ethnic lines, free from state interference. Hafez al-Assad did the opposite on both fronts, and the new authorities have shown no awareness of sectarianism’s deadly danger—or any intention to confront it.

Two policy things are very vital now. Full autonomous authority for the committee investigating “the events in the coast,” which has just gained three additional months for its mandate. The new transitional government will lose all credibility if the committee fails to name things by their right names, punish the perpetrators, and deliver justice to the victims.

Second, Sharaa must speak openly to the Syrian people about the old and new tragedies, and their structural connection to sectarianism. He must be able to say that the Alawites are Syrian citizens, equal to all others in rights, duties, and respect. The old feuds must be left to history. He and his men must act, think, and speak like statesmen, not like victorious parties or sects. Sectarian rhetoric must be condemned, and religious figures who use it should be held accountable. The state must encourage initiatives across society, especially in sensitive regions, to foster dialogue and understanding.

It is a vital necessity to salvage Syria’s future from becoming a mere repetition of its recent past, where victims become perpetrators, or vice versa. This vicious circle of sectarianism must be broken here and now.