The New Syrian Government and the Current Status of the Islamic State and al-Qaeda in Syria

By Aaron Y. Zelin, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy

Nearly six months after the fall of the Assad regime, Syria’s new government faces immense challenges following fourteen years of civil war. One key issue is the ongoing threat posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and al-Qaeda, both a domestic security concern and a test of the Interim Government’s (IG) credibility in the eyes of Western powers. The US-led Global Coalition has spent nearly a decade combating ISIL in Syria and continues to target al-Qaeda operatives. If Damascus can demonstrate competence in countering these groups, it may ease international concerns rooted in the IG leadership’s past ties—having broken with ISIL in 2013 and al-Qaeda in 2016. The current leadership, once part of Jabhat al-Nusrah and later Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), has now been unaffiliated with ISIL for twelve years and al-Qaeda for nine.

The State of the ISIL Insurgency and Terrorism Campaign In Syria

Since the collapse of its territorial control six years ago, ISIL has been in steady decline. However, the threat has not disappeared. The group maintains a low-level insurgency in northeastern and eastern Syria and continues to target urban areas and minority communities. This was reiterated with the group’s car bomb attack on a security post in al-Mayadeen in Deir Ezzor governorate on May 18 that killed 5 from the Syrian security services. As of 15 May 2025 it had claimed 33 attacks, which is on pace to forecast 89 attacks for the entire year if the trend continues. This would be the lowest since the group’s entry into Syria in 2013. All reported attacks have occurred in areas controlled by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

While the group’s own claims are notable, they have been known to underreport since 2020. As a corrective, the Rojava Information Center—despite its proximity to the SDF—claims that ISIL conducted 55 attacks in the first four months of 2025, projecting 165 by year’s end. Even this would mark the lowest number since the Center began tracking in 2019.

We have yet to see a successful ISIL attack in the territory that the IG controls, though not for a lack of trying. ISIL has dedicated at least a half-dozen of its weekly al-Naba newsletter editorials since the fall of the Assad regime to denouncing the new Syrian government as apostates and branding it a tyrannical force on par with other regimes in the region.

On 11 January 2025, the IG foiled a plot in Damascus to bomb the Sayyida Zainab shrine—a prominent Shi’a site in the Damascus suburbs—aimed at sparking sectarian unrest. According to The Washington Post, US intelligence tipped off Damascus, marking an early test of cooperation. In interrogations released by the Ministry of Interior, suspects confessed to planning a failed car bombing targeting a church in Maaloula on New Year’s Day, and to plotting the assassination of President Ahmad al-Sharaa if he had attended the shrine.

On 15 February 2025, the Public Security Directorate arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, a senior leader in ISIL’s Iraq Province, who had been involved in the assassination of former senior HTS leader Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani in April 2024 and also helped organize the failed Sayyida Zainab plot. The arrests relating to the latter plot appear to have led to intelligence that allowed Damascus to find Abu al-Harith.

In addition, the Public Security Directorate arrested ISIL cells in the towns of al-Naima (18 February) and al-Sanamayn (6 March) in Daraa governorate, as well as most recently in eastern Aleppo (17 May). Since then, the situation has remained relatively calm, though rumors persist that ISIL operatives from the Homs badiyah (desert region) have moved into urban areas. So far, worst-case scenarios have not materialized, though vigilance remains essential for both Damascus and the Global Coalition.

Beyond attacks and plots, a persistent concern is the network of detention centers and IDP camps housing ISIL affiliates. Roughly 9,000 male ISIL fighters remain in detention in northeast Syria, while al-Hol—still the largest IDP camp—holds 34,068 women and children considered ISIL affiliates, down from a peak of 72,000 in 2019. These facilities remain high-value targets for ISIL breakouts and are frequently referenced in the group’s propaganda.

Al-Qaeda’s Defunct Branch—Huras al-Din

Al-Qaeda’s presence in Syria has all but vanished. Its former branch, Huras al-Din, formally dissolved itself in late January 2025, though it claimed it would retain its weapons. This marked a symbolic end to al-Qaeda’s failed efforts in Syria since 2011. Jabhat al-Nusrah, once an affiliate, broke with al-Qaeda in July 2016. Al-Qaeda attempted to reestablish a foothold via Huras al-Din in February 2018, but that group was eventually dismantled by HTS (formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusrah) in June 2020 and ceased to be operationally relevant thereafter.

Since Huras al-Din’s dissolution, no public incidents of violence involving its remnants have been recorded. Nonetheless, US CENTCOM has continued targeting individuals linked to the group, announcing four airstrikes so far in 2025. It is plausible that the new Syrian government is providing intelligence on these operatives. Earlier this year, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan confirmed in an interview with France24 that Türkiye had long acted as a conduit for intelligence from HTS to the Global Coalition—a claim that had long been suspected but not previously acknowledged.

Al-Qaeda’s leadership, sidelined and increasingly irrelevant, has attempted to revive attention through recycled messaging. In early May, it republished a 2011 video originally directed at Libya, repurposing it as a warning to Syrians about the risks of not implementing Islamic law. The move highlighted the group’s current detachment from Syria’s evolving landscape.

While jihadist groups have proven resilient in the past, neither al-Qaeda nor ISIL currently pose a large-scale threat to daily life in post-Assad Syria. That could change if economic conditions continue to deteriorate and sanctions remain in place. Should the IG be perceived as illegitimate or ineffective, it could create an ideological opening for these extremist actors to reassert influence—arguing that engagement with the West is futile. Preventing that scenario requires sustained attention and support. The stakes extend beyond Syria’s borders, with serious implications for regional and international security.